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 the some of negroes
 over
 board
 the rest in lives
 drowned
 exist did not
 in themselves
 preservation
 obliged
frenzy 
thirst for forty others
 etc1
 
One of a cycle of poems written by M. NourbeSe Philip, titled Zong! #3,2 this 
particular fragment exposes the tension between different (and sometimes 
competing) conceptualizations of value that characterised the enslavement of 
black Africans. “Some negroes,” the equivalent sum of negroes, were jettisoned 
like any other species of cargo, by Captain Luke Collingwood in the hopes of 
recovering the value of the insurance funds that had been secured by the slave 
 
* Senior Lecturer, School of Law at SOAS, University of London. 
 Many thanks to the participants of the “Law As . . .” II Workshop held at the University of 
California, Irvine School of Law in 2011, Alberto Toscano, and David Lloyd for the helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this paper.  Thanks also to the editors of the UC Irvine Law Review for 
their editorial assistance. 
1. M. NOURBESE PHILIP, Zong! #3, in ZONG! 6 (2008). 
2. Id. 
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owners.3 The slaves did not exist in themselves (as individual human beings) in the 
eyes of the law, or one may surmise, Captain Collingwood, but rather as a type of 
property that could be deemed superfluous—an “etcetera.” 
The simultaneous presence of these competing forms of value in the same 
object (a slave’s value, however ambiguous, as a person marked by racial 
difference, and her value as a commodity) speaks to the coemergence of modern 
conceptualizations of race and modern forms of property. Writing about the ways 
in which the money form and race emerged in a “codeterminate and 
interdependent”4 manner, O’Malley analyzes the narrative of Broteer Furro, a 
slave who was captured at the age of eight and taken to Rhode Island sometime 
around 1737.5 Furro, having taken the name of Venture after being sold into 
slavery, recounts the subsequent use of his self as a form of credit and value by his 
owner.6 As O’Malley points out, Venture comes to see himself as inseparable from 
his status as commodity. When asked why his master would want to sell him, he 
replied: “I could not give him the reason, unless it was to convert me into cash, 
and speculate with me as with other commodities.”7 
As O’Malley notes, “Venture sees his self and the money as the same.”8 The 
collapse of object and subject into one and the same, and thus, the blurring of a 
distinction of profound importance to a western philosophical episteme that has 
influenced the organization and conceptualization of a system of property 
ownership in many liberal democracies, throws up a multitude of contradictions 
and complexities for thinking through the relationship between being and having. 
This collapsing of boundaries between object and subject, thing and person, 
concretized in the body of the slave presents the most extreme form of this hybrid 
juridical form. Other forms of extreme subjection under European colonial rule 
have similarly produced a psychic life rife with the agonies of being treated legally, 
socially, and politically as both object of ownership and subject capable of criminal 
liability.9 
The relationship between being and having, or ontology and property 
ownership, animates modern theories of citizenship and law. The relationship has 
philosophical, symbolic, and political-economic significance. The treatment of 
 
3. See generally IAN BAUCOM, SPECTERS OF THE ATLANTIC: FINANCE CAPITAL, SLAVERY, 
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (2005). 
4. MICHAEL O’MALLEY, FACE VALUE: THE ENTWINED HISTORIES OF MONEY & RACE IN 
AMERICA 20 (2012). 
5. Id. at 33. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 34. 
8. Id. 
9. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BEST, THE FUGITIVE’S PROPERTIES: LAW AND THE POETICS OF 
POSSESSION 1–22 (2004) (examining the relationship between laws pertaining to fugitive slaves and 
transformations in the law of intellectual property, and exploring the co-constitution of personhood 
and forms of property); COLIN DAYAN, THE LAW IS A WHITE DOG: HOW LEGAL RITUALS MAKE 
AND UNMAKE PERSONS 40–42 (2011) (providing a magisterial examination of how the law 
dehumanizes detainees, criminals, and slaves). 
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people as objects of ownership through the institution of slavery calls our 
attention to the relationship between property as a legal form and the formation 
of an ontology that is in essence, racial. My primary aim in this Article is to 
provoke consideration of how both the legal form of property ownership and the 
formation of the racial10 from the eighteenth century onwards rely on a logic of 
abstraction,11 and it is the operation of this logic which irrevocably fuses property 
and race together. In some senses, this provocation to consider the role of a logic 
of abstraction merely emphasizes a relation that others have explored, if not 
explicitly, through intertwined histories of slavery, property, and the money form 
with great attention to the empirical contexts in which they take shape.12 In 
engaging this analytical framework that explores the co-constitution of the legal 
form of property and the racial, I attempt to point to the contradictions that 
inhere in the materialization of abstractions in the subjectivities of owner and 
owned, colonizer and colonized. 
By way of this provocation, I will begin by discussing the now canonical 
article by Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property,13 in order to identify questions that 
her thesis generates in terms of furthering our understanding of the co-
constitution of the racial and property ownership as legal forms. I will move from 
a consideration of Harris’s article to present a basis for thinking through 
abstraction as the motor force of transformations in the legal form of property 
that emerges from the eighteenth century onwards. I will conclude by considering 
how recent work theorizing the emergence of new forms of property in the form 
of finance capital in the eighteenth century emphasizes the centrality of slavery to 
this process but fails to adequately theorize the racial.14 
 
10. I use the term “the racial” at times, rather than the terms racial difference or race, in order 
to refer to the ways in which philosophical concepts, economic forces, and scientific invention work 
in collaboration to produce race as a strategy and technique, both of which are deployed to create and 
sustain particular forms of subjectivity, of law, and of being. This concept draws heavily from the 
work of DENISE FERREIRA DA SILVA, TOWARD A GLOBAL IDEA OF RACE (2007).  
11. My point of departure, drawing on the work of Evgeny Pashukanis, is that the legal form 
reflects the commodity form, as the legal form mirrors and supports existing relations of production, 
property relations, and market forces. See EVGENY B. PASHUKANIS, LAW AND MARXISM 96 (Chris 
Arthur ed., Barbara Einhorn trans., Ink Links Ltd. 1978) (1929); BERNARD EDELMAN, OWNERSHIP 
OF THE IMAGE: ELEMENTS FOR A MARXIST THEORY OF LAW 21–26 (Elizabeth Kingdom trans., 
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1979) (1973); Brenna Bhandar, Disassembling Legal Form: Ownership and 
the Racial Body, in NEW CRITICAL LEGAL THINKING: LAW AND THE POLITICAL 112, 112–27 
(Matthew Stone et al. eds., 2012). 
12. See BAUCOM, supra note 3, at 59–64 (arguing that the tragedy of slavery and the 
accumulation of speculative capital from the eighteenth century impacts today’s financial capital); 
BEST, supra note 9, at 225–28 (examining the effect of abstraction in the context of Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537 (1986), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); O’MALLEY, supra note 4, at 
32–40 (discussing the deep history and providing a penetrating analysis of American thinking about 
money and the ways that this ambivalence unexpectedly intertwines with race). 
13. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993). 
14. O’Malley makes a similar argument in relation to the slavery, race, and money form in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America, arguing that some scholars analyze the economic 
dimensions of slavery and fail to account adequately for race, and vice-versa. O’MALLEY, supra note 4, 
at 81. O’Malley argues that “beneath the enthusiasm for market freedom lies the desire to have value 
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I. SLAVERY, WHITENESS, AND GREAT EXPECTATIONS 
In her article Whiteness as Property Cheryl Harris, inspired by the work of 
Derrick Bell, sets a new trajectory for considerations of the relationship between 
law, property, and race. Illuminating the linkages between the history of slavery 
and the dispossession of Native Americans in the course of the founding of the 
United States of America, Harris presents a very persuasive and novel theoretical 
framework for understanding how whiteness came to have value as a property in 
itself; a value encoded in property law and social relations. For Harris, the genesis 
of whiteness as a property in and of itself begins with the commodification of 
black bodies during slavery.15 
Harris begins by arguing that the propertizing of human life—the lives of 
black slaves—is what facilitates the merger of white identity with property. Slavery 
created a form of property that was contingent on race; “only Blacks were 
subjugated as slaves and treated as property.”16 This form of property thus 
produced a hybrid legal form that has both the status of object and human. The 
figure of the slave collapses the very distinction that property law relies upon to 
structure and regulate the use of land and moveable (both tangible and intangible) 
property.17 As I will explore below, this blurring of boundaries between thing and 
person reflects the same conflation of self with property that justifies private 
property ownership for John Locke and Jeremy Bentham. The materialization of 
the abstraction of the Black or Negro in the body of the slave who is 
simultaneously object of ownership and subject (who can be held liable for 
crimes); or the materialization of the abstract sovereign subject whose very self is 
constituted through his ownership of things, are far more messy and contradictory 
than one might initially suspect. 
Harris explores in depth the consequences of fusing property and race 
through chattel slavery. Black slaves count as three-fifths of a person in the 
Representation Clause in the American Constitution; by the seventeenth century 
black women’s bodies become a means of producing more slave-property and 
reproducing the master’s labor force.18 While initially racial boundaries were not 
so strictly defined, the increasing importance of chattel slavery to Southern 
colonies in the seventeenth century ensured that the racial subordination of Native 
Americans and Blacks was increasingly intertwined with the appropriation of land 
and its cultivation.19 
Racial subordination becomes enshrined in laws that attribute a lesser legal 
status to slaves and Native Americans. Whiteness thus comes to have the status of 
 
rest on some solid ‘natural’ foundation” and that racial difference provided the market with a fixed, 
non-negotiable value through the subordination of black people. Id. at 42. 
15. Harris, supra note 13, at 1716–21. 
16. Id. at 1716. 
17. See Bhandar, supra note 11, at 114–15. 
18. Harris, supra note 13, at 1718–19. 
19. Id. at 1717–18. 
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property in relation to the status of white people as full legal citizens. The creation 
of whiteness as a form of property that has “income-bearing value”20 emerges as 
forms of labor come to be legally differentiated on a racial basis. As chattel slavery 
is consolidated in slave laws,21 white workers cannot be enslaved and significantly, 
workers come to identify as white workers as a means of differentiating themselves 
from the Blacks who are unpersonned and degraded as objects of ownership.22 As 
Harris notes, “whiteness became a shield from slavery.”23 
Significantly, Harris discusses the transition from whiteness as status 
property to a more contemporary or modern form of property, in which 
whiteness as an entitlement to preserve the status quo (of racial subordination) is 
reflected in formalist interpretations of equal rights doctrine. Whereas Plessy v. 
Ferguson24 recognized whiteness as a status property, Brown v. Board of Education25 
replaces this form of whiteness as property with a “more subtle form . . . . In 
failing to clearly expose the real inequities produced by segregation, the status quo 
of substantive disadvantage was ratified as an accepted and acceptable base line—
a neutral state operating to the disadvantage of Blacks long after de jure 
segregation had ceased to do so.”26 Whiteness, as a property and as a privilege, 
gives the owner of this property a sense of entitlement that becomes naturalised in 
the everyday order of things. 
Harris’s article in many ways remains unsurpassed in its theorization of the 
way in which whiteness is a property that has economic value, one which was 
historically enshrined in a range of laws, and persists in the unspoken, 
unchallenged backdrop to contemporary litigation over affirmative action policies. 
At this juncture, I would like to explore in more detail Harris’s theorization of the 
interrelationship of property and race. She begins by arguing that “rights in 
property are contingent on, intertwined with, and conflated with race.”27 Property 
and property rights are racially contingent; that is, property rights in land are from 
 
20. David R. Roediger, Critical Studies of Whiteness, USA, 48 THEORIA 72, 80 (2001) (quoting 
W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: 1860–1880, at 17–31, 700–01 (Atheneum 
1992) (1935)). 
21. Harris, supra note 13, at 1720. 
22. The literature on this topic is vast. See DU BOIS, supra note 20, at 17–31 (discussing the 
color caste system in labor that has persisted since before the Civil War and was facilitated by the 
white working class and its fear of competition from free black workers); NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW 
THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 75–77 (1995) (examining the Irish attachment to the Democratic Party 
based on a vision of a society polarized between white and black); see generally DAVID ROEDIGER, 
WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (3d ed. 
2007) (arguing that racism cannot be explained simply with reference to economic advantage; rather, 
white working-class racism is underpinned by a complex series of psychological and ideological 
mechanisms that reinforce racial stereotypes and thus help to forge the identities of white workers in 
opposition to Blacks).  
23. Harris, supra note 13, at 1720. 
24. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
25. Brown, 347 U.S. 483. 
26. Harris, supra note 13, at 1753. 
27. Id. at 1714. 
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the beginnings of settlement and colonization in the United States based on the 
“racial subordination of Blacks and Native Americans.”28 In terms of her 
theorisation of the property form itself, Harris argues that “social relations that 
produced racial identity as a justification for slavery also had implications for the 
conceptualization of property.”29 The social relations that produced slavery grew 
out of an ideology of white supremacy. Harris thus rightly identifies white 
supremacy as a prime determinant of an economic system (slavery) that was 
thoroughly racialized and absolutely central to the formation of property and 
property rights in the United States. For Harris, property laws take shape through 
an economic system that is saturated with race, and the racial ideology of white 
supremacy, rather than the property form itself, is determinant of this system. 
In theorizing the shift from an early modern to a late modern concept of 
whiteness as property, Harris argues that whiteness shares the critical 
characteristics of property. The rights to use and enjoyment, the reputation and 
status property of whiteness, and the power to exclude, for instance, are all critical 
characteristics shared by various forms of property, whether it be physical 
property such as land or whiteness.30 Like property, whiteness has economic 
value, value that is not immutable but is contingent on shifting economic 
conditions and social relations. Race is, on Harris’s analysis, an analogue of 
property. Harris presents a powerful analysis of how whiteness functions in the 
same way that property and property rights do. However, how does Harris’s 
theorization of property itself shed light on the coemergence of private property 
and the racial? In other words, how does a certain notion of race in the abstract 
figure of the slave, the native, the savage, coemerge with forms of property that 
are similarly abstracted as commodity forms? 
Harris maps a shift from the type of property protected in Plessy as status, to 
Brown, which she identifies as a “modern” form of property.31 What lies in this 
distinction, and this transformation? Property, from the eighteenth century 
onwards, undergoes transformations in the legal form that ownership takes, 
reflecting changes in the justifications of private property ownership. Lockean and 
Benthamite theorizations of property inform Harris’s analysis,32 but in my view, 
the shifts in conceptualizations of property have far greater significance to the co-
constitution of the racial and private property ownership than she attributes to 
them. 
Abstraction lies at the basis in transformations of how property comes to be 
conceptualized from the eighteenth century onwards. Taking the instance of land 
as a general focal point, the long and variegated shift from feudal landed property 
holding to capitalist private property ownership required significant legal 
 
28. Id. at 1715. 
29. Id. at 1718. 
30. Id. at 1734–36. 
31. Id. at 1746–57. 
32. See, e.g., id. at 1725 nn.60 & 63. 
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innovation to securitize new forms of ownership. Whereas possession and use 
once justified ownership, the commoditization of land witnessed a shift in the 
conceptual underpinnings of ownership itself. While Locke had reconceived of 
land ownership as based not on hereditary titles and inheritance (birthright), but 
on labor,33 Bentham emphasizes expectation and security as the key justifications 
for private property ownership.34 In the work of Bentham, we see an abstract 
notion of ownership not based on physical possession, occupation, or even use, 
but the concept of ownership as a relation, based on an expectation of being able to 
use the property as one wishes.35 Primary to the property relation is law, which 
secures the property relation, or guards and protects the expectation.36 
In the work of Bentham, private property becomes naturalized through 
affective structures of ownership.37 Like Locke, there is an abstract idea of 
ownership in Bentham’s thought not based on physical possession or occupation. 
There is the notion of a relation, based on an expectation of being able to use 
one’s property as one wishes. Whereas Locke asserts property ownership as a 
natural right, which flows from a particular idea of self,38 Bentham asserts 
expectation, a feeling of expectation that arises from ownership.39 However, like other 
justifications for private property ownership, Bentham’s rendering of the 
relationship between expectation and property law is rife with tautological 
reasoning. If I own property, even something quite remote from where I actually 
am, for instance, a plantation in the West Indies, this ownership gives rise to an 
expectation, and this expectation can only “be the work of law.” “Property and 
law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made there was no 
property; take away laws, and property ceases.”40 I have the expectation because I 
have property, but property itself is nothing more than this expectation. 
Bentham’s writing, like Locke’s, is consistently peppered with references to 
the figure of the savage, which provides a distinctive referent point against which 
civilization is defined.41 If property law exists in order to secure one’s 
expectations, law’s raison d’ être for Bentham is security. The expectation of being 
able to use and exploit one’s property hinges on this ability of being free from 
interference from arbitrary powers, state authorities, the needs of others, and fear 
of loss by any other means. Set as a sort of permanent relief in the backdrop is 
always the fear of savagery which is defined by the absence of respect for the 
 
33. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 299 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press student ed. 1988) (1689). 
34. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112–13, 118–19 (photo. reprint 2011) (R. 
Hildreth trans., 6th ed. 1890) (1802). 
35. Id. at 112. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. E.g., LOCKE, supra note 33, at 286–87. 
39. BENTHAM, supra note 34, at 112. 
40. Id. at 112–13. 
41. See, e.g., id. at 112; LOCKE, supra note 33, at 274. 
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inviolable laws of property. The “beneficent genius” that civilizes savagery is 
security.42 
Bentham notes that in the state of nature, there is some indication of savages 
respecting the acquisitions of each other, which reflects the introduction of a 
“principle to which no name can be given but that of law.”43 It seems then, that 
laws of property arise from the quite natural feeling of men, even savages, to want 
to secure for himself by his own means, the enjoyment of certain things. Law is 
what establishes “a strong and permanent expectation” of property,44 not mere 
physical possession. 
For Bentham, this expectation is an abstraction, but one with very material 
effects. He writes: “There is no image, no painting, no visible trait, which can 
express the relation that constitutes property. It is not material, it is metaphysical; 
it is a mere conception of the mind.”45 It is also a conception that gives rise to or 
is consonant with structures of affect and feeling. The expectation that one can 
utilize a thing that one owns to “be[] able to draw such or such an advantage from 
the thing possessed”46 reflects the intrinsic value of property. And this connection 
between property as a metaphysical relation and real feelings of expectation link 
having (or owning in an abstract sense) to one’s very being. Bentham writes: 
Everything about it represents to my eye that part of myself which I have 
put into it—those cares, that industry, that economy which denied itself 
present pleasures to make provision for the future. Thus our property 
becomes a part of our being, and cannot be torn from us without rending us 
to the quick.47 
So while physical possession and use are no longer the justifications for 
ownership, possession as a feeling, entitlement, and the desire to secure one’s 
property become the sine qua non of ownership. Harris illuminates how this 
expectation, a sense of entitlement to a range of social and economic goods 
defines whiteness as a property, particularly in the post-Brown era. However, I 
think Bentham’s theory of ownership explains how one’s property, which is an 
abstract and exterior thing—be it expectation to use a resource uninhibited by 
state interference, a sense of security from theft, or an entitlement to enjoy—
comes to be materialized, or comes to have an actual life, in how we are 
constituted as subjects. The notion that property exists as a metaphysical entity is 
only part of the story. Property mirrors the commodity form, and as I will explore 
below in relation to Ian Baucom’s work, produces obscene degrees of violence in 
rendering human beings as forms of money capital. As O’Malley has noted, “racial 
value anchored monetary value” at the dawn of American settlement.48 But the 
 
42. BENTHAM, supra note 34, at 118–19. 
43. Id. at 112–13. 
44. Id. at 113. 
45. Id. at 112. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 115 (emphasis added). 
48. O’MALLEY, supra note 4, at 11. 
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violence of abstraction takes on a life in the very real lived experiences of people 
constituted by juridical forms shaped by the property-racial matrix. The ideology 
of white supremacy, which Harris identifies as one of two principal causes of the 
propertization of whiteness49 (the other and related cause being chattel slavery), 
emerges in conjunction with a concept of property based on a commodity logic. 
And thus, we may sharpen and deepen her observation that “racial identity as a 
justification for slavery also had implications for the conceptualization of 
property.”50 
Property from the eighteenth century thus comes to be metaphysical, but at 
the time, intensively embodied in the experiences and self-conception of colonial 
subjects. This fusing of subjectivity with objectivized properties creates 
contradictions reflected in the very notion of self-ownership that derives from 
Lockean justifications for private property ownership. The body is both the 
container for one’s very being as an agentive subject and simultaneously a 
resource, a source of labor that one owns. The body of the slave is both treated 
juridically as one who can be held legally culpable for crimes but is also an object 
to be owned by others.51 And for Bentham, as noted above, one’s sense of 
entitlement, expectation, and cares for that which one owns form the core of 
one’s very being.52 Thus Harris’s theorization of how whiteness becomes property 
maps the transition from real forms of property to abstract forms of property 
rooted in expectation; however, she does not identify this transition as in part, a 
consequence of the radical changes occurring in modes of propertization. In 
recounting the psychic trauma that her grandmother experienced in sometimes 
performing the attribute of whiteness in order to survive economically in the Jim 
Crow era, Harris reflects a theory of how whiteness becomes an abstract property 
with legally encoded economic value that is also central to the real lived 
experiences of oppressed communities.53 However, it is important to account for 
how whiteness, and the racial apparatus more generally, are produced by the same 
logic of abstraction that renders slaves, parcels of land, cargo stock, and other 
things as having equivalent value in the money form. 
Abstraction functions in such a way so as to create legal forms of property 
and racial ontologies coterminously. Emergent forms of property ownership were 
constituted with racial ontologies of settler and native, master and slave. This is as 
evident in the burgeoning realm of finance capital and its relationship to the slave 
trade as it is with regard to transformations in how the ownership of land is 
conceptualized in the colonial settler context. It is not merely the case that racist 
ideologies of savagery enabled the dispossession of indigenous communities on 
 
49. Harris, supra note 13, at 1714–16. 
50. Id. at 1718. 
51. BEST, supra note 9, at 16 (characterizing the fugitive slave as “competing parts pilfered 
property and indebted person”); DAYAN, supra note 9, at 89 (analyzing the definition of the slave as a 
“person in law” for the purposes of punishment).  
52. BENTHAM, supra note 34, at 112. 
53. Harris, supra note 13, at 1710–14. 
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the basis that they were too “low in the scale of social organization”54 to be 
recognized as property owners. I argue that more than this, the very nature of 
property ownership from the eighteenth century onwards is created through a 
mode of abstraction that entangles notions of legal-political personality within it. 
We might say here that abstraction lies at the basis of an ontology of property and 
the racial, and that the each of these phenomena rely upon the other for their 
actual, material realization. 
The laws that gave effect to these transformations took many different 
guises, including the legal regulation of shares and companies,55 stock (shipping 
and insurance law), and land. In each of these domains, the legal form evolves to 
support a burgeoning network of finance capital. For instance, the legal form of 
ownership in relation to land shifts from one that reflects the use and possession 
of land as embedded within feudal social relations, to a legal form of ownership 
that had as its primary objective, the alienation and marketization of land as a 
commodity. As a commodity, land was imbricated within a circuit of trading, 
exchange, and colonization—land in the colony of South Australia, for instance, 
was used as collateral to finance loans to fund colonial surveying activities even 
prior to actual settlement of the land. 
The legal form that land ownership took shifted from the eighteenth century 
onward from one rooted in actual practices, use, and memory, to an abstract form 
of title that was to be deposited and held in a Land Registry.56 Throughout the 
nineteenth century, there were successive attempts to introduce a system of title 
by registration in Britain, whereby ownership of land would no longer be 
conveyed in a manner that required physical and customary demonstration of 
proof of ownership, but rather, would require all interests in the land to be 
congealed in one document.57 The contents of this title document would serve as 
ultimate proof of ownership of land, irrespective of any other, and crucially, prior 
interests in the land that were not noted therein.58 
The violence of abstraction in this context lies in the production of an object 
of exchange deracinated of the lived, social relations of occupation, multiple use, 
 
54. Mabo v. Queensland, (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 39 (Austl.). 
55. Paddy Ireland et al., The Conceptual Foundations of Modern Company Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 149, 
152 (1987). Paddy Ireland, Ian Grigg-Spall, and Dave Kelly argue that from the 1830s, “the legal 
nature of shares began to be reconceptualised, and by the mid-nineteenth century the close link 
between shares and the assets of companies had been severed.” Id. As Ireland et al. argue, the case of 
Bligh v. Brent, 2 Y. & C. 268 (1837), embodies the moment of where a definitive severance of shares in 
a joint stock company (whether incorporated or not) from the assets of the company occurs, 
rendering shares as a type of property in themselves, equivalent to a portion of the revenue of the 
company. Ireland et al., supra, at 152. Shares become personalty, even if the company holds real 
property as its assets. Id. at 153. Ireland et al. argue that these transformations in the juridical concept 
of the share to a form of money capital reflect par excellence the rise of fictitious capital. Id. at 156. 
56. W.S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAW 308 (1927); Alain 
Pottage, The Measure of Land, 57 MOD. L. REV. 361, 377–78 (1994). 
57. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 56, at 316. 
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spiritual significance, and prior histories that attach to the land. One of the most 
important instruments devised to realize this abstraction in the form of ownership 
was title by registration. Title by registration, first trialled in the colony of South 
Australia in 1857, was very much enabled by the treatment of South Australia as a 
terra nullius. Aboriginal peoples were an inferior race, blackfolks, to be displaced 
and corralled into reservations, educated, civilized, and protected by the Crown. 
Similar to the claims that Harris makes in relation to the appropriation of Native 
American land, it is often argued that because the land was viewed as a terra nullius, 
the colonists were able to impose a system of private property ownership in 
Australia, and of course this is true.59 However, it seems that this misses the 
significance of the prevailing concept of property that was held by the colonists 
even prior to settlement. The figure of the savage that made aboriginal rights to 
land a non-question, and lies at the heart of the doctrine of terra nullius, shares a 
similar conceptual apparatus and logic as the property form itself. It is this logic of 
abstraction, with all its myriad violence which enables this vision of free and 
fungible land to be materialized. To sum up, in the context of landed private 
property, the abstract nature of the commodity form takes on a juridical life that 
creates and relies upon the abstract categories of native and settler to define the 
boundaries of ownership. 
Private property emerges in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in a co-
constitutive relationship with race, and what I have been referring to as the racial 
emerges in relation to and dependent upon modern forms of private property. 
Whereas Harris’s theorization of the relationship between property and race does 
not sufficiently consider the significance of the changing nature of the legal form 
of property from the eighteenth century onwards in the constitution of the racial, 
recent work by Baucom examines the centrality of slavery to finance capital, and 
how the fictitious nature of capital is ultimately and initially based on the radical 
objectification of human beings as slaves.60 
II. SLAVERY, PROPERTY, AND FICTITIOUS CAPITAL 
The relationship between the abstract nature of property and the institution 
of slavery has been explored by Ian Baucom in Specters of the Atlantic: Finance 
Capital, Slavery and the Philosophy of History.61 The book is focused on the infamous 
Zong case, where the underwriters of an insurance corporation were engaged in a 
civil litigation dispute with the owners of slaves who claimed the proceeds of an 
insurance policy for the deaths of 132 slaves who were murdered by the Zong’s 
Captain Collingwood en route to Jamaica.62 Four months after they had left West 
Africa, the Captain made the decision to throw the slaves overboard to their 
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death; sixty slaves and ten crewmembers had already died on the voyage as a result 
of disease and malnutrition. Rather than face further financial loss in the form of 
dead slaves, Captain Collingwood decided that if he were forced by necessity to 
jettison the slaves, their owners could collect the insurance proceeds.63 Although 
there was no necessity at the point at which he ordered his crew to throw the 
slaves overboard, he instructed them to tell anyone who asked them, that they 
were running short of water.64 Of the 132 slaves that were killed, ten of them 
resisted the absolute power of the slaveholders by leaping to their own deaths.65 
The case resulted in a dispute over the insurance contract, and centered on 
whether the actions of the Captain were necessary or not. Despite evidence at the 
trial that there was in fact no water shortage, the court found for the slave 
owners.66 On appeal, Lord Mansfield ordered a new trial on the question of 
whether the fact of necessity had been established.67 
The emergence of finance capital in the eighteenth century, which becomes 
intensified in the twentieth century, relies on particular structures of knowledge. 
Drawing on the work of J. G. A. Pocock and Giovanni Arrighi, Baucom makes a 
persuasive and powerful argument that the “central epistemological drama of the 
long eighteenth century” was a result of the contestation between old, real, and 
tangible forms of property and the “imaginary value of stocks, bonds, bills-of-
exchange, and insured property of all kinds.”68 As the latter transcended the 
former in economical significance, “the concepts of what was knowable, credible, 
valuable, and real were themselves transformed.”69 Following Pocock, and also 
Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of history that reconfigures the interrelatedness of 
aesthetic form, the logic of capital, and a critique of historicism, Baucom analyzes 
the insurance contract as an exemplary instance of new forms of knowledge. 
Central to burgeoning circuits of finance capital were credit and debt, and new 
epistemological structures required above all faith in the imaginary values 
promised by ocean-crossing bills-of-exchange, promissory notes, and other 
financial instruments that made the slave trade possible.70 At the moment when 
the insurance contract between the would-be slave owners and the insurance 
company was signed, neither party to the contract had “possessed anything more 
than an imaginary knowledge of the property they had agreed to value at 15,700 
pounds, they could and did legally bind themselves to credit that knowledge and, 
by that act of crediting one another’s imagination, brought that value into legal 
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existence.”71 It is thus a fictitious value that lies at the basis of the insurance policy 
that comes to be the centre of the dispute in the Zong case. Crucially, Baucom 
illuminates how at this moment, the value created (in this case, by the capture and 
bondage of Africans and their eventual sale as slaves in Jamaica) does not precede 
exchange, but “retrospectively confirms it.”72 The value created, in other words, is 
not based on a pre-existing use value that is then transformed in the act of 
exchange. Exchange based on a system of credit and debt requires a collective act 
of imagination and trust; faith in the promise of money value, “value in the guise 
of the ‘general equivalent.’”73 
Slavery takes central stage in this nuanced account of the financialization of 
commodity exchange. By replicating shipping lists that described slaves as so 
much other tangible cargo,74 Baucom initially introduces the reader to the violence 
of abstraction by subtly emphasizing that at the basis of this particular circuit of 
exchange lay the absolute objectification of human beings. Significantly however, 
he develops an analysis of how the slave becomes both commodity and interest-
bearing money, thereby demonstrating how property in its legal forms as 
commodity and money are constituted through the radical objectification of 
humans, of black Africans, to be more specific. The bills of exchange referred to 
above were one aspect of a banking system based on credit. Local sales agents in 
the Caribbean or the Americas would sell newly arrived slaves and then “‘remit’ 
the proceeds of the sale in the form of an interest-bearing bill of exchange.”75 This 
bill of exchange was in effect a promise to pay the full amount with interest at a 
rate agreed upon at the end of a specified period. Baucom explains this transaction 
in the following way: 
The Caribbean or American factor had thus not so much sold the slaves 
on behalf of their Liverpool “owners” as borrowed an amount equivalent 
to the sales proceeds from the Liverpool merchants and agreed to repay 
that amount with interest. The Liverpool businessmen invested in the 
trade had, by the same procedure, transformed what looked like a simple 
trade in commodities to a trade in loans. They were not just selling slaves 
on the far side of the Atlantic, they were lending money across the 
Atlantic. And, as significantly, they were lending money they did not yet 
possess or only possessed in the form of the slaves. The slaves were thus 
treated not only as a type of commodity but as a type of interest-bearing 
money.76 
Slaves thus become a “flexible, negotiable, transactable form of money.”77 
And this fact enables Captain Collingwood to devise a plan whereby the loss of 
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the disappeared slaves can be recouped in the form of insurance proceeds. It is 
only because the slave is conceptualized as a form of money, represented by the 
bills of exchange and loan agreements that structure the capital flow of the slave 
trade that enables Collingwood to “confidently massacre 132 slaves aboard the 
Zong.”78 
The first third of Specters of the Atlantic is intensely stimulating in its 
illumination of how political economy, legal forms of ownership, and aesthetic 
forms emerge within novel epistemological frames. Baucom’s inventive borrowing 
of Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of history to argue that the emergence of finance 
capital in the eighteenth century returns in the twentieth century in intensified 
forms79 illuminates the contemporary relevance of insurance contracts, the rise of 
the joint stock company, the proliferation of new forms of money (significant 
actors in the banking industry), and other instruments of finance capital. However, 
as the book progresses, concerns with forms of witnessing, literary 
conceptualizations of temporality and historicism, and the affective dimensions of 
property relations become the primary focus. Curiously, and what sets this text far 
apart from the theorization of whiteness that inform Harris’s analysis of chattel 
slavery and laws of property generally, is the utter absence in Baucom’s text of any 
serious or sustained treatment of race. 
This is quite curious in a book that traces the emergence of finance capital as 
dependent upon the institution of slavery. And while Baucom certainly does not 
shy away from expressing the horrific levels of violence that were prerequisite to 
treating African slaves as chattels and also the basis for financial speculation, he 
does not account for the place of race and raciality in this process of extreme 
dehumanization. In analyzing the forms of modern subjectivity that emerge out of 
an epistemology of financialization, he turns to both Slavoj Žižek’s reformulation 
of the Kantian subject as subject $ (the slaves were “regarded by the law to have 
vanished” in two senses, the brutal act of slaughter and the “antecedent 
dematerialization as subjects of insurance”), and Gayatri Spivak’s native 
informant.80 However, even in borrowing Spivak’s figure of subalternity, race is 
nowhere to be found in his analysis of the means by which slaves become “no 
more than the empty bearers of [an] abstract specie value.”81 In one of the final 
chapters Baucom analyzes the black-Atlantic literature, the work of Derek 
Walcott, Toni Morrison, Paul Gilroy, and Éduoard Glissant,82 yet the significance 
of blackness and the racial ideology of superiority that was so central to the 
propertization of those who were enslaved remains firmly outside of this 
otherwise acutely insightful analysis of the emergence of finance capital through 
slavery. 
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Baucom argues that the Zong trial and the events that led to it are “late-
eighteenth-century and late-twentieth-century events [that] are subtended by and 
script a common and long-durational cycle of accumulation, speculation, and 
subjectification.”83 To this, as the very texts by Gilroy, Morrison, Walcott and 
Glissant attest to,84 we would need to add the word “racialization.” 
III. CONCLUSION: CAPITAL, RACE, AND PROPERTY 
 Negro tried
to cash hisself
for Money     ¢¢¢
 at a bank. . .
 
Got arrested
as a 
counterfeit
 
 
Nickel! 85
 
 
Amiri Baraka’s poem captures in a few words the conflation of race, the 
money form, and its impossible contradictions for the subject who bears the 
legacy of this monstrous hybridization wrought by chattel slavery and finance 
capital, the former being indispensable to the growth of the latter. Baraka writes 
that a “Negro tried/ to cash hisself/ for money.”86 It is an attempt to transform 
one sort of specie to another; let’s take note of the absence of the word “in” 
between “hisself” and “money.” There is no mediation here, no split between who 
he is as a person and his monetary value, no aspect of his person that exceeds his 
status as an abstract value. Our protagonist attempts a direct exchange of his very 
own self for money. He succeeds, for a moment, before being criminalized as a 
fake, as counterfeit money. He is guilty for committing, and of being, a fraud. 
Baraka’s “Negro” protagonist, much like Venture referred to in the Introduction 
of this Article,87 cannot fully realize his monetary value for hisself (or as himself for 
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that matter); he is caught in the impossible position of being object of circulation 
and subject who is only recognized as such by the law in matters criminal. This is 
the fact of blackness, the story of “negrosity” in the law. 
In this Article, I explored the work of Ian Baucom who has examined the 
centrality of slavery and the figure of the slave in emergent forms of property and 
significantly, the system of credit and debt that enabled finance capital to 
decisively collapse real and intangible forms of value in the body of the slave.88 
However, there is in his account a distinct absence of an accounting for the ways 
in which abstraction operated in the constitution of a particular discourse of the 
racial. In Harris’s germinal piece on the creation of whiteness as a property in 
itself, I argued that there is a failure to fully account for the ways in which 
transformations in conceptualizations of ownership shaped emergent racial 
abstractions in the figures of the savage and slave, the very figures that were 
required to effectively dehumanize slaves as chattel property (and financial 
instruments) and to render indigenous communities immaterial to land 
appropriation. 
As discussed above, transformations in conceptions of ownership that 
occurred from the eighteenth century onwards reflect the transcendence of the 
commodity form and its reflection in the legal regulation of land, stock, and 
companies. Possession and occupation as justifications for ownership preceded 
this shift, and eventually do not provide a justification or basis for ownership. 
However, I argue possession remains central to the lifeworld of property, the 
possession of particular qualities and attributes that give rise to a sense of 
entitlement and security. This contradictory mixture of attributes that are both 
metaphysical, embodied, and affective shape the very constitution of modern 
legal-political subjectivities. Notions of privilege and entitlement shape the 
contours of one’s consciousness, based on the possession of particular qualities 
and characteristics that constituted the pre-requisites of one’s ability to own 
property. Understanding the historical development of the interrelationship 
between the legal form of property and the racial remains crucial to accounting for 
contemporary iterations of a globalized capital firmly rooted in histories of slavery 
and colonialism. 
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